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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JERRY RICKETTS, ; 
Plaintiff and ] 
Appellant, ] 
vs. 
V & H LEASING SERVICES, INC. ] 
a Wisconsin corporation, ] 
Defendant and ] 
Respondent• ] 
) Case No. 88-0005 
i Case Priority 14.a. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT AND 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The Supreme Court of Utah has appellate jurisdiction 
over appeals from Orders of the District Court over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. 78-2-3(i) (1987). This 
appeal is from an Order Regarding Plaintiff's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment in which the trial court dismissed Plaintiff's 
Complaint, no cause of action. A true and correct copy of 
the Order is set forth in the Addendum submitted herewith. 
1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
I. 
Does an owner/lessor have a statutory duty to maintain 
the parking brake on its vehicle? 
II. 
Is the statutory duty to maintain a parking brake 
delegable, by contract with a lessee, so that third parties 
injured by an inoperable parking brake cannot recover against 
the owner? 
III. 
Does an owner/lessor of a motor vehicle have a common 
law duty to inspect its vehicle? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 25, 1986, 
asserting claims for negligent maintenance of a vehicle owned 
by defendant V & H Leasing Services, Inc. Plaintiff also 
asserted a claim against a contractor, Neil Brienholt, for 
negligent parking of his vehicle at the construction site 
where Plaintiff was injured. (R. 1-5). Defendant Brienholt 
was subsequently dismissed upon Stipulation of the parties to 
this action (R. 50-51). Subsequently, discovery was 
accomplished and Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend his 
2 
Complaint after completion of discovery. (R. 72-73)- An 
Amended Complaint was filed on October 1, 1987, alleging 
claims against Defendant for failure to inspect its vehicle, 
negligent inspection of its vehicle, and negligent 
maintenance of its vehicle. (R. 83-87). Defendant 
thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with 
supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities. (R. 91-
102). Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment with accompanying Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities. (R. 112-127). The respective Motions came on 
for hearing before the Honorable Douglas S. Cornaby, District 
Court Judge, on November 24, 1987. Judge Cornaby granted 
Defendant's Motion and denied Plaintiff's Motion resulting in 
the Order set forth in the Addendum. 
Plaintiff Jerry Ricketts (herein Ricketts) sustained 
serious injury to his arm resulting in replacement of his 
elbow with a plastic elbow. (R. 119). The surgery has left 
a fifteen inch (15") scar on his arm and has caused permanent 
injury. (R. 119). Ricketts' injury occurred on February 27, 
1985, while Ricketts was working for his employer, Swanson 
Building Materials. The accident occurred while one Brian 
Eberhardt was driving a 1984 Ford flatbed truck at a 
construction site in Davis County. Ricketts had been guiding 
3 
Brian Eberhardt's backing of the truck due to the fact that a 
pickup truck was parked in front of the construction site, 
Ricketts was assisting Eberhardt by standing towards the back 
of the truck and giving hand instructions on how far 
Eberhardt could back the truck without hitting the parked 
pickup truck. When the truck stopped, Eberhardt put the 
truck in neutral, set the parking brake and began to exit the 
vehicle. As he exited the vehicle, the truck rolled 
backwards, pinning Ricketts' arm against the parked pickup 
truck. (R. 118, 119). Ricketts' employer, Swanson Building 
Materials, had leased the truck from Defendant V & H Leasing 
Services, Inc. (hereinafter V & H Leasing) and Defendant V & 
H Leasing was owner of the truck at the (time of the accident 
herein. (R. 116). 
Prior to February 27, 1985, Ricketts' employer had been 
advised that there was a problem with the parking brake on 
the flatbed truck in that it was inoperable. (R. 118). 
Furthermore, V & H Leasing did not inspect the truck they 
owned after delivery on August 15, 1980, (R. 157) and relied 
solely upon the provisions of the lease agreement between 
Defendant V & H Leasing and Swanson Building Materials as 
follows: 
"4. Registration and Inspection. Lessee 
shall accomplish, at the expense of 
4 
Lessee, the titling, registration, and 
licensing of each vehicle in the name of 
Lessor, and all inspections thereto 
required by governmental authorities 
during the lease term. Lessee shall 
permit Lessor to inspect any vehicle from 
time to time at reasonable intervals... 
6. Maintenance and Repairs. (a) Lessee, 
at the expense of Lessee, shall maintain 
each vehicle and each part thereof, in 
good working order and condition, 
properly serviced and lubricated, and 
make all necessary repairs and 
replacements thereto. Title to all 
replacements shall vest in Lessor. All 
such servicing, lubrication and repairs 
shall be accomplished at Lessor's garage 
unless Lessor shall consent in writing to 
the contrary, unless any interested 
insurance company shall direct 
otherwise..." (Emphasis supplied). (R. 
117) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff maintains there is a statutory duty upon the 
owner of a vehicle to properly maintain the parking brake so 
that it will not cause injury. Ricketts maintains that this 
statutory duty applies to Defendant V & H Leasing because 
Defendant V & H Leasing is statutorily defined as the owner 
of the vehicle for purposes of maintenance of the vehicle. 
Furthermore, Ricketts maintains that he proved a prima facie 
case of breach of the foregoing statutory duty by virtue of 
the testimony of Bruce Eichbaur (who was the manager of 
Ricketts' employer's trucks) that the parking brake was 
5 
inoperable prior to the accident. As such, Ricketts 
maintains there was a duty owed to Plaintiff by rhe owner of 
the vehicle, Defendant V & H Leasing, which Defendant V & H 
Leasing breached because it did not properly maintain the 
parking brake on the flatbed truck. 
Ricketts also maintains that the lease agreement between 
V & H Leasing and Ricketts' employer, Swanson Building 
Materials, cannot, as a matter of law, operate to defeat 
Ricketts' claim as to Defendant V & H Leasing, That is, the 
delegation by contract/lease of the statutory duty to 
maintain a parking brake does not affect Ricketts' right of 
recovery as to the owner of the vehicle, 
Finally, Ricketts maintains that thfere exists a common 
law duty to inspect one's motor vehicle and Defendant V & H 
Leasing was negligent in inspecting its Vehicle inasmuch as 




DEFENDANT V & H LEASING AS OWNER/LESSOR 
HAS A STATUTORY DUTY TO MAINTAIN THE 
PARKING BRAKE ON ITS VEHICLE AND THE 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-145(b) (as amended 1953), 
6 
provides as follows: 
"Every motor vehicle and combination of 
vehicles shall have a parking brake 
system adequate to hold the vehicle or 
combination on any grade on which it is 
operated under all conditions of loading 
on a surface free from snow, ice or loose 
material or which shall comply with 
performance standards issued by the 
Department." (Emphasis supplied). 
The foregoing statute quite clearly prescribes a 
standard of safety regarding automobiles/trucks that applies 
to owners/lessors such as Defendant V & H Leasing. That the 
foregoing statute was intended to apply to owners/lessors can 
be found in express statutory intent in the definition 
sections of the motor vehicle act: 
"If a vehicle is the subject of an 
agreement to lease, the Lessor is 
considered the owner until the Lessee 
exercises its option to purchase the 
vehicle." U.C.A. 41-l-l(x) (as amended 
1953). (Emphasis supplied). 
Further, the violation of the parking brake statute by V 
& H Leasing is prima facie evidence of negligence. See Hall 
v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848, 850 (Utah 1981), Little America 
Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, (Utah 1982). Numerous 
courts have held violation of brake statutes to constitute 
negligence. Lvnghaug v. Payte, 76 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 1956); 
Ferran v. Jacguez, 68 N.M. 367, 362 P.2d 519 (1961); Swope v. 
Fallen, 413 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. 1967); Piatt v. Gould, 548 P.2d 28 
7 
(Ariz, App. 1976); Johnson v. McAfee, 261 S.E.2d 708 (Ga. 
App. 1979); Hartford Accid. & Indemn. v. J. I. Case Co., 625 
F.Supp. 1251 (S.D. Ohio 1985). Moreover, the statutory duty 
rests on both the owner and the driver. Wilcox v. Glover 
Motors, Inc., 269 N.C. 473, 153 S.E.2d 76 (1967). 
In view of the foregoing compelling authority, the trial 
court committed reversible error in holding that there is no 
statutory duty of an owner/lessor to maintain a parking brake 
on its vehicle in Utah. As such, the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court for a jury trial on the merits. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
STATUTORY DUTY TO MAINTAIN BRAKES IS 
DELEGABLE AND THIS CASE SHOULD BE 
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH AN ORDER THAT 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BE GRANTED. 
A principal defense of Defendant V & H Leasing to this 
action was that no statutory duty to maintain a parking brake 
existed because of the contractual delegation of the duty to 
repair contained in the lease agreement with Swanson. (See 
paragraph 4 of the lease provision quoted in the Summary of 
Argument hereinabove). This argument is wholly unfounded and 
not supported by sound case law because several courts have 
specifically held the statutory duty to maintain brakes is 
non-delegable. Malonev v. Rath, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897, 445 P.2d 
8 
513 (1968); Wentworth v. Ford Motor Co., 501 P.2d 1218 
(Nevada 1972); Raqer v. Superior Coach, 111 Arizona 204, 526 
P.2d 1056 (1974) . 
Moreover, a recent California case demonstrates the 
scope of the foregoing rule of law. In Kalev v. Catalina 
Yachts, 232 Cal. Rptr. 384 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1986), 
plaintiff Kaley was employed as a truckdriver by a company 
known as Coast to Coast Distributors. During his employment, 
plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by a corporation 
known as Catalina Yachts. While plaintiff was driving the 
vehicle, the vehicle malfunctioned and plaintiff sustained 
injuries from a resulting accident. Coast to Coast was 
responsible for maintaining and using the vehicle and 
exercised full control over the truck. Plaintiff brought 
suit against the owner (Catalina) of the truck and obtained a 
$407,000.00 jury verdict. Catalina appealed, asserting that 
it had no opportunity to control, repair or maintain the 
truck. The Appellate Court rejected Catalina's argument and 
held: 
"That Coast may have undertaken to do all 
of the maintenance work on the truck does 
not absolve Catalina. There was 
certainly substantial evidence that Coast 
was Catalina's agent for that purpose. 
Assuming, however, that Coast was not 
Catalina's agent but was, rather, an 
independent contractor, Catalina chose to 
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do business with Coast and to allow it to 
operate and maintain the truck which the 
jury impliedly found to belong to 
Catalina. Catalina is in no better 
position than Ramona Rath in Maionev v. 
Rath, supra, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 71 Cal. 
Rptr. 897, 445 P. 2d 513, or Bodo Dziabas 
in Clark v. Dziabas, supra, 69 Cal.2d 
449, 71 Ca. Rptr. 901, 445 P.2d 517, who 
had their brakes overhauled, some three 
months and six months respectively, 
before the accidents in those cases." 
(Kalev at 391.) (Emphasis supplied). 
Defendant V & H Leasing should not be permitted to 
absolve itself of liability through a contractual delegation 
of duties as to Plaintiff and the lower court's holding that 
a contractual delegation of duties is effective as to third 
parties should be reversed and remanded for a jury trial. 
III. 
DEFENDANT V & H LEASING HAS A COMMON LAW 
DUTY TO INSPECT ITS VEHICLE AND BREACHED 
THAT DUTY BY FAILING TO PERFORM ANY 
INSPECTIONS ON THE VEHICLE IT jOWNED. 
The owner of an automobile may be held liable to third 
persons for injuries resulting from a defective or unsafe 
i 
condition of the vehicle if, through exercise of reasonable 
care, the owner should have known of th4 defect or condition. 
See Lane v. Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986); accord, White 
v, Pinnev, 99 Utah 484, 108 P.2d 249 (1940). Moreover, the 
Utah Supreme Court stated in White the general rule of law to 
be: 
10 
"The owner or operator of a motor vehicle 
must exercise reasonable care in the 
inspection of the machine, and is 
chargeable with notice of everything that 
such inspection would disclose.... the 
great weight of authority holds that 
there is no liability on the part of an 
owner where an outsider has been injured 
by a defective mechanism which was 
unknown to the owner and which would not 
have been disclosed by a reasonable 
inspection". Id at P.2d 253. 
Plaintiff maintains the foregoing Utah case law imposes 
a duty to inspect upon V & H Leasing. Moreover, the lease 
agreement between V & H Leasing and Swanson implicitly 
acknowledges this duty by reserving in V & H Leasing the 
right to perform inspections. Furthermore, the duty to 
inspect increases as a vehicle grows older, Scudamore v. 
Horton, 426 S.W.2d 142 (Ky. 1968) and the fact that the 
vehicle had been with Swanson for four and one-half years 
imposed a greater duty upon V & H Leasing to exercise 
reasonable care. 
Defendant V & H Leasing breached the duty to inspect by 
its candid admission in its responsive Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities that it had not inspected or maintained the 
vehicle after delivery to Swanson Building Materials. As 
such, Plaintiff can prove a prima facie case of negligence 
under the foregoing case law and the lower court's granting 
11 
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was therefore 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Jerry Ricketts 
maintains that the court erred in not granting his Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment determining that Defendant V & H 
Leasing has a statutory duty to maintain its truck as well as 
a common law duty to inspect its truck. Furthermore, 
Plaintiff Jerry Ricketts maintains the court erred in holding 
the statutory duty to maintain a parking brake is delegable 
and the Order granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be reversed and remanded for a jury trial. 
DATED this ^L day of /flLi , 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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V & H LEASING SERVICES, INC., 
a Wisconsin corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER REGARDING 
1 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
I FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 39,279 
Judge Cornaby 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, District Court Judge, 
on the 24th day of November, 1987, at 3:30 p.m., with the 
Plaintiff appearing in person with his counsel, Phillip W. 
Dyer, and Defendant V & H Leasing Services, Inc., appearing 
through its counsel, Joy L. Sanders of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau. Respective counsel thereupon argued the matter to 
the Court. After hearing the argument of counsel, the Court 
having concluded that the Defendant had no common law duty to 
FfLJVT^ 
fijir OEC - 3 PH 3=32 
MICHAEL G ALLPHiH. CLERK 
2ND OlSlnlCT COURT 
BYL. AP 
DLPUir CLFR* 
inspect the vehicle it owned, that the Defendant had no 
statutory duty to maintain the parking brake on its vehicle 
and that any statutory duty the Defendant may have had to 
maintain the parking brake on its vehicle was a delegable 
duty that Defendant had delegated by a lease/contract, and 
good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is 
denied. 
2. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
because Defendant had no common law duty to inspect its 
vehicle, the Defendant has no statutory duty to maintain the 
parking brake on its vehicle and any statutory duty the 
Defendant may have had was a delegable duty that Defendant 
had delegated by a lease/contract.-* 
3. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed with 
prejudice as to Defendant V & H Leasing Services, Inc., no 
cause of action, without costs. 
DATED this ja_ day of Z)<z<r * t 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONO^A^^DOUGLA^ CORNABY^ 
District Court Judge 
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III 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Francis Fecteau being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he served 
ORDER REGARDING MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
upon the fallowing parties by hand delivering a true and correct 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
JOY L. SANDERS, ESQ. 
RAYMOND M. BERRY, ESQ. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEA 
10 Exchange Place 
llth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
DATED this 30th day of Nov^ fliber 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me £hi s _SI day of 
My Commission 
Public 
•~» ^n****! bait La ke County, Utah 
/ *•> 4 
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Utah Code Annotated 41-6-145 
41-6-145 • Braking systems required - Adoption of performance 
requirements by department. 
(b) Every motor vehicle and combination of vehicles 
shall have a parking brake system adequate to hold the 
vehicle or combination on any grade on which it is operated 
under all conditions of loading on a surface free from snow, 
ice or loose material or which shall comply with performance 
standards issued by the department. 
V 
Utah Code Annotated 41-1-1 
41-1-1. Definitions. 
(x) "Owner" means a person who holds the legal title of 
a vehicle. In the event said title reflects the names of two 
or more persons as coowners in the alternative by use of the 
word "or" or "and/or", each coowner is considered to have 
granted to the other coowners the absolute right to endorse 
and deliver title and to dispose of the vehicle. In the 
event the title reflects the names of two or more persons as 
coowners in the conjunctive by use of the word "and", or the 
title does not reflect any alterative or Conjunctive word, 
the title shall thereafter require the endorsement of each 
coowner to transfer the vehicle. If a vehicle is the subject 
of an agreement for the conditional sale or installment sale 
or mortgage thereof with the right of purchase upon 
performance of the conditions stated in the agreement and 
with an immediate right of possession vested in the 
conditional vendee or mortgagor, or if the vehicle is the 
subject of a security agreement, then the conditional vendee, 
mortgagor, or debtor is considered the owner for the purposes 
of this chapter. If a vehicle is the subject of an agreement 
to lease, the lessor is considered the owner until the lessee 
exercise his option to purchase the vehicle. 
VI 
PHILLIP W. DYER (4315) 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
318 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 363-5000 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 





V & H LEASING SERVICES, INC. 
a Wisconsin corporation, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
CERTIFICATE OF FILING 
AND SERVICE 
Case No. 88-0005 
Phillip W. Dyer, attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, 
hereby certifies that on the *^Y day of March, 1988, the 
original and ten copies of the Brief of Appellant were filed 
with the Clerk of the Supreme Court by hand delivery, and 
that four copies of the Brief of Appellant were hand 
delivered to Raymond M. Berry, Esq., and Joy L. Sanders, 
Esq., Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent, at SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84111. 
DATED this day of /^C^ci , 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Phillip W. Dyer* 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
